The German government is currently examining regulatory measures to restrict the use of Chinese inverters in energy infrastructure. This is stated in its response to a parliamentary question submitted by the Green Party on the security of Chinese technologies in critical infrastructure.

A cross-departmental process is already underway involving the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) and the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). The aim is to assess risks associated with networked energy systems and to develop possible technical and regulatory responses. The government said various regulatory measures are currently under review. It is also considering the use of Section 41 of the BSI Act, which empowers the Ministry of the Interior to prohibit or restrict operators of strategic infrastructure from using critical IT components.

The government’s response indicates that concrete policy options are being assessed. It shares the view that the use of Chinese inverters in networked energy systems entails significant cybersecurity and economic security risks. It also notes that Chinese companies are legally obliged to cooperate with state authorities under Chinese law.

In this context, the government states verbatim: “In China, there are far-reaching legal obligations for companies and private individuals to cooperate with state agencies—obligations that run counter to the security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, the EU, and NATO.”

According to the government, around 70% to 80% of PV inverters used in Europe currently originate from Chinese manufacturers. Coordinated access to a large number of such networked systems could, in principle, affect the stability of the power supply.

The government also refers to ongoing initiatives at EU level. It welcomes the recent European Investment Bank’s decision to stop financing new projects that use inverters from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. It also supports an EU-wide harmonised approach to managing risks associated with such components.

Future risk assessments, according to the government, should go beyond purely technical product characteristics. They should also include non-technical criteria such as the legal framework in the manufacturer’s country of origin, geopolitical risks and corporate dependencies.

At the same time, the Federal Government is reviewing European Commission proposals to revise the Cybersecurity Act. This includes discussions on a potential list of “high-risk vendors” that could face exclusion from the EU single market, similar to measures taken in the rollout of 5G networks. The government said it sees an urgent need for action and is currently assessing the proposals.

Beyond product origin, the response points to a broader element of the EU “de-risking” strategy. In this regard, the German government is preparing a standalone Investment Screening Act (IPG) intended to consolidate and systematise existing investment control rules currently embedded in the Foreign Trade and Payments Act. No further details have been released.

It is also reviewing the European Commission’s proposals for the planned Industrial Accelerator Act. Discussions include the possibility of imposing stricter conditions on investments in strategic industries, such as requirements on ownership structures or joint ventures. The aim would be to prevent manufacturers from high-risk countries from circumventing potential market restrictions by supplying the EU market via subsidiaries or production partners outside China. The government has not yet adopted a final position on the proposal but confirmed that it is under review.